IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Debt Relief for Egypt?

Listed author(s):
  • John Williamson


    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

  • Mohsin S. Khan


    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

The government of Egypt recently stated that external financial assistance is necessary in the present economic situation and has expressed a strong preference for receiving it in part via debt relief. Williamson and Khan explore whether there is a case for debt relief and if so what form this relief should take. They review the cases of Egypt in an earlier era and other middle-income countries—Iraq, Argentina, and Nigeria—that benefited from debt relief, as well as the loan guarantees provided by the United States to Israel, to draw out the lessons and implications for Egypt. In terms of reducing debt service payments, debt relief was certainly successful in each of the countries reviewed. The authors conclude with recommendations for a new debt relief program for Egypt. The traditional approach to debt relief would be through a Paris Club debt rescheduling. The United States could call for the Paris Club to meet to consider Egyptian debt, use its influence to persuade the Egyptians to request a meeting, and then call on its partners to make offers similar to those that President Obama already made in his speech on May 19, 2011. A more promising approach might be for the United States to use its convening power to persuade other countries ("Friends of Egypt") to make debt relief arrangements similar to those that the United States has already offered to Egypt. Complementary to this process, the United States could also urge its partners to make loan guarantees similar to those that it itself has offered.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Peterson Institute for International Economics in its series Policy Briefs with number PB11-17.

in new window

Date of creation: Nov 2011
Handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb11-17
Contact details of provider: Postal:
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036-1903

Phone: 202-328-9000
Fax: 202-659-3225
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb11-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peterson Institute webmaster)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.