Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy
We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. In the experiment we observe significant over-contribution. This result is similar to those of the typical corner solution experiments.
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