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Instituciones políticas y el colapso del crecimiento

Listed author(s):
  • Ugo Panizza
  • Alejandro Gaviria
  • Ernesto H. Stein
  • Jessica Seddon Wallack

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se pone a prueba si los resultados de Rodrik (1999) de que las instituciones de manejo de conflictos se relacionan con la capacidad de reaccionar a sacudidas económicas son valederos ante maneras distintas de definir la calidad de tales instituciones. Cuantificamos la calidad de las instituciones de manejo de conflictos con dos índices distintos. El primero tiene que ver con las limitantes políticas sobre la capacidad del Poder Ejecutivo de imponer su voluntad. Estas limitantes coartan la capacidad del gobierno de modificar arbitrariamente las reglas del juego, y por lo tanto pueden reducir las pugnas de la redistribución. El segundo índice mide el nivel de particularismo político. Definimos el particularismo político como la capacidad de los diseñadores de políticas de promover sus carreras mediante la atención de intereses subalternos, en vez de los de una plataforma nacional más amplia. Los índices usados en este trabajo resuelven las distorsiones de la endogeneidad y subjetividad que afectan la medida de la calidad institucional de Rodrik. Hallamos un fuerte apoyo a la idea de que elevados niveles de limitantes políticas y niveles intermedios de particularismo político guardan relación con una recuperación rápida de las sacudidas económicas.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4208.

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Date of creation: May 2000
Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4208
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