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Who's in Charge? Understanding Rallying and Accountability in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author

Listed:
  • Ignacio Lago
  • Santiago Lago-Peñas

Abstract

This study explores how the COVID-19 pandemic influenced the rally and accountability effects on incumbent parties at both the national and regional levels. We argue that these effects depend on who is responsible for health policy in each country. Using a measure of static party nationalization, we analyze 988 lower house elections across 105 countries from 1960 to 2020, and predict nationalization scores for elections held after March 11, 2020. Our analysis of 35 elections in 30 countries during the pandemic reveals that the impact was more national than regional, driven by the number of casualties rather than the stringency of containment measures. The rally effect was observed only in unitary states, where the national government had full responsibility for managing the pandemic. In federal and confederal countries, where regional governments are also responsible for public health policies, no clear impact on nationalization scores was observed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2026. "Who's in Charge? Understanding Rallying and Accountability in the COVID-19 Pandemic," IDEAGOV Working Papers WP2612, IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance.
    • Handle: RePEc:ida:wpaper:wp2612
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Ignacio Lago & André Blais, 2025. "Floods, terrorist attacks and the COVID-19 pandemic: the relationship between the (de)centralisation of power and the rally around the flag," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(1), pages 2224836-222, December.
    5. Ignacio Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2016. "An economic explanation of the nationalization of electoral politics," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1602, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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