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Multilateral Bargaining in Political Science Experiments: A Survey

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  • Glenn Harrison

Abstract

The political science literature has long been concerned with the behavioral properties of alternative bargaining institutions. The focus of most of this research has been on the way in which committees make decisions, but there has been some interest in legislative and electoral processes. From the outset this literature has concerned itself primarily with multilateral bargaining setting, as distinct from the economics literature which has displayed an odd reluctance to go beyond the bilateral bargaining setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Glenn Harrison, 1991. "Multilateral Bargaining in Political Science Experiments: A Survey," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 90-gatt31, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:90-gatt31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 258-272, May.
    2. Mussa, Michael, 1982. "Imperfect factor mobility and the distribution of income," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1-2), pages 125-141, February.
    3. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    4. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-837, December.
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