Stochastic Dynamics for the Matching Pennies Game
We consider stochastic dynamics for the Matching Pennies game, that behave, in expectation, like best-response dynamics (the continuous fictitious play). We prove convergence to the unique equilibrium by extending the result of Benaim and Weibull  on deterministic approximations for stochastic dynamics to the case of discontinuous dynamics - such as the best-reply dynamics.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2006|
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