The Impact of Family Ownership on the Divestment Decision
Using 1972 firm-year observations of Belgian subsidiaries, I examine whether the previously documented better performance of family firms can be attributed to the more efficient divestiture decision in these firms. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results reveal that families holding large blocks of shares engage in more restructuring activity. Also, when the founder is present in the family firm, when the chairman of the board belongs to the family or when the function of CEO and chairman is not occupied by the same person, the likelihood of a voluntary restructuring will be higher.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://research.hubrussel.be|
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