The Ambiguous Case for Letting Regulators Tailor Standards
Restrictions preventing regulators from setting standards on a firm by firm basis are commonly assumed to be inefficient. Existing rationales for their prevalence have been politico-economic. We provide an efficiency interpretation. We characterise settings in which the requirement that firms be treated equally is (a) definitely desirable (b) definitely undesirable and (c) where the case is ambiguous.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2000|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2000|
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