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Revolving Doors and Regulatory Complexity



Regulators often go on to lucrative careers either working for, or selling advice to, the industry they previously policed. We investigate the implications of this phenomenon for the design of regulatory institutions. The policy response of cooling-off periods (as used in the UK, US, France and elsewhere) is often welfare-reducing. Capping advisory fees is shown to be a better solution.

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  • Anthony Heyes, 2000. "Revolving Doors and Regulatory Complexity," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 99/1, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2000.
  • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:9901

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    More about this item


    Regulatory institutions - expert advice;

    JEL classification:

    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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