Revolving Doors and Regulatory Complexity
Regulators often go on to lucrative careers either working for, or selling advice to, the industry they previously policed. We investigate the implications of this phenomenon for the design of regulatory institutions. The policy response of cooling-off periods (as used in the UK, US, France and elsewhere) is often welfare-reducing. Capping advisory fees is shown to be a better solution.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2000|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2000|
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