The Impact of the Termination Rule in Cooperation Experiments
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- Sigrid Suetens & Jan Potters, 2007.
"Bertrand colludes more than Cournot,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 71-77, March.
- SUETENS, Sigrid & POTTERS, Jan, 2005. "Bertrand colludes more than Cournot," Working Papers 2005037, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Suetens, S. & Potters, J.J.M., 2007. "Bertrand colludes more than Cournot," Other publications TiSEM 884b5bf4-2acb-4ce8-b2bf-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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KeywordsTermination rule; end-game e ect; infinite horizon; repeated games;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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