The Impact of the Termination Rule in Cooperation Experiments
This paper analyzes the impact of three termination rules for repeated- game experiments. We compare treatments with a known finite end, an unknown end and two variants with a random termination rule. The termination rules do not significantly e ect cooperation rates.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2004|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2004|
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