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中国上場企業の投資行動 : 非金融業における政府支配の影響分析


  • ハスビリギ
  • 竹, 康至


政府系企業の経営問題は広く知られており、中国国有企業の株式化と上場は、ガバナンス改善を目的としたものだと考えられる。しかしながら、上場後も政府が過半の株式を保持する国家支配企業が多く存在し、完全に民営化が行われているわけではない。先行研究では、資金調達に国家支配が影響していることが指摘されている。資金調達構造が投資行動に影響しうる事から、国家支配が投資に影響を与えている事は想像に難しくないが、今までの研究では国家支配の投資行動への影響は明確にされてこなかった。そこで本稿では、投資率、負債比率、投資機会を内生変数とする同時方程式モデルを3SLSで推定し、中国上場企業の投資の決定要因の分析を行った。その結果、資金調達構造が他国とは異なる影響を持ち、政府支配の投資への影響が観察された。これらは、中国の国有企業改革や資本市場の育成は中途の段階であることを示すものである。, Public enterprise's management problems are well known. The modern corporate system reforms of state-owned enterprises in China are thought to be aimed at improving governance. However, a large percentage of the total listed companies in China are state-controlled companies (government holds a majority of shares) that have not been completely privatized. Recent research pointed out that state-control influences the corporate financing behavior in China. Based on the fact that financial structure affects investment behavior, it is possible that state-control influences corporate investment behavior. As far as we know, it is not clear how state-control impacts investment behavior.The aim of this paper is to clarify the effect of state control on investment behavior. Based on the corporate system and share structure of China's listed companies, we classify all samples into state-controlled company groups and non-state-controlled company groups, and analyze the determinants of investment in China's listed companies by estimating a simultaneous equation model with 3SLS. In this model, we treat investment ratio, debt ratio and investment opportunity as endogenous variables.The result of our analysis shows that financial structure affects firm's investment ratio and this effect is different from the effect in other countries. In addition, we find state-control effect on investment ratio. These results indicate that China's state-owned enterprises reforms and development of capital markets are at the halfway stage yet.

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  • ハスビリギ & 竹, 康至, 2009. "中国上場企業の投資行動 : 非金融業における政府支配の影響分析," Discussion Papers 2009-08, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2009-08 Note: The investment environment and firm investment behavior of listed companies in China: An empirical study on the effect of government ownership

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    投資関数; 中国; 移行経済;

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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