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A Noncooperative Approach to General n-Person Cooperative Games


  • Okada, Akira


We present a noncooperative foundation of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution for a general n-person cooperative game in strategic form in which coalitions exert externalities. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach leads to a new concept of the core, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game in which any deviating coalition anticipates the Nash bargaining solution behavior of the complementary coalition. We prove that when the probability of negotiation failure is sufficiently small, there exists uniquely a (totally) efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining model, in which the grand coalition forms with the agreement of the Nash bargaining solution, if and only if the Nash bargaining solution belongs to the Nash core. The weights of players for the asymmetric Nash solution are determined by their likelihood to make proposals.

Suggested Citation

  • Okada, Akira, 2005. "A Noncooperative Approach to General n-Person Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 2005-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2005-01
    Note: April, 2005; August 2005 (revised)

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