IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Voluntary Participation in a Mechanism Implementing a Public Project

Listed author(s):
  • Shinohara, Ryusuke
Registered author(s):

    In this study, a participation game in a mechanism to implement a public project is considered; in this game, agents decide simultaneously whether they will participate in the mechanism or not. We characterize the sets of participants at strict Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, and coalition-proof equilibria of the participation game. The three sets of equilibria are shown to coincide and exist. All the equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient at any one of three notions of equilibria. However, if the public good can be provided in multiple units or if there are multiple projects, then these sets may fail to coincide.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2004-14.

    in new window

    Length: 27 p.
    Date of creation: Mar 2005
    Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2004-14
    Note: March 18, 2005 (First Version: July 2003)
    Contact details of provider: Phone: +81-42-580-8000
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2004-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.