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Voluntary Participation in a Mechanism Implementing a Public Project


  • Shinohara, Ryusuke


In this study, a participation game in a mechanism to implement a public project is considered; in this game, agents decide simultaneously whether they will participate in the mechanism or not. We characterize the sets of participants at strict Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, and coalition-proof equilibria of the participation game. The three sets of equilibria are shown to coincide and exist. All the equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient at any one of three notions of equilibria. However, if the public good can be provided in multiple units or if there are multiple projects, then these sets may fail to coincide.

Suggested Citation

  • Shinohara, Ryusuke, 2005. "Voluntary Participation in a Mechanism Implementing a Public Project," Discussion Papers 2004-14, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2004-14 Note: March 18, 2005 (First Version: July 2003)

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    More about this item


    Participation game; Public project; Strong equilibrium; Coalition-proof equilibrium; Multi-unit public good; Multiple projects;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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