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  • 青木, 玲子
  • Vaithianathan, Rhema


本稿では、2011年12月に行ったインターネット調査のデータを使って、子供の有無と子供の年齢によって、政策や政党への選好が異なるかを検証した。子供の代わりに親が投票するドメイン投票方式が少子高齢化による有権者の年齢構造による弊害を打開する効果があるかという問に対して、肯定的な事実がいくつか観察された。回答者(有権者)が重要と思う政策には、確かに未成年の子供がいるかいないかで異なることがわかった。未成年の子供がいる有権者は子育て支援が重要と考えるのに対して、未成年の子供がいない有権者(子供がいないか、成人の子供しかいない)にとっては、年金が重要である。さらに、興味深いのは、未成年の子供のいる有権者に、子供にとっては教育が重要な政策であると考えている。実際にドメイン投票方式によって子供の票も親が投票することを考慮して、ドメイン投票ブロック(未成年の子供のいる有権者+子供)と非ドメイン投票ブロック(成人の子供がいる有権者+子供のいない有権者)が重要と思う政策を比較すると、顕著な違いがでた。(表5)。支持政党に関する調査の質問も分析をした。多くの未成年の子供のいる有権者は、子供と自分の票を異なる政党に投票すると答えている(図7)。さらに、2票投票できると、「支持政党なし」という回答が1票の場合の60%から40.1%に減少することもわかった。複数の票があると、政党を組み合わせて意志表示できると推測できる。(これは他のPreference Votingなどの制度の有効性を示唆している。)しかし、未成年の子供のいる有権者とそれ以外の有権者のあいだの支持政党の差は、政策の差とくらべると、小さい(図9)。これは、現在は高齢者の有権者の影響力が圧倒的であるため、どの政党もそれに対応した政策提案をしているため、政策の選好が政党の支持と関係が弱いせいであると考えられる。逆に、ドメイン投票方式の導入により、まず政党の提案する政策やマニフェストの内容が変わることが予測できる。

Suggested Citation

  • 青木, 玲子 & Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2012. "世代間の政治経済-選挙に関するアンケート結果から," CIS Discussion paper series 540, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:cisdps:540

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