Two Essays on Central Bank Independence Reforms
This thesis consists of two empirically oriented papers on Central Bank Independence (CBI) Reforms. Paper  is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 89 had implemented CBI reforms during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries. Paper , using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurence of CBI reforms in 132 countries during the period 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.
|Date of creation:||27 Nov 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden|
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0792. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Skog)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.