Fiscal Externalities and Asymmetric Information in an Economic Federation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Longin, Francois M., 2000. "From value at risk to stress testing: The extreme value approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 1097-1130, July.
- François Longin, 2001. "Extreme Correlation of International Equity Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 649-676, April.
- Bystrom, Hans N. E., 2004.
"Managing extreme risks in tranquil and volatile markets using conditional extreme value theory,"
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- Byström, Hans, 2001. "Managing Extreme Risks in Tranquil and Volatile Markets Using Conditional Extreme Value Theory," Working Papers 2001:18, Lund University, Department of Economics.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Linda Andersson & Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikstr–m, 2004. "Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(3), pages 243-263, May.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2001. "Optimal Taxation and Risk-Sharing Arrangements in an Economic Federation," Umeå Economic Studies 538, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsFiscal externalities; informational asymmetries: optimal taxation and provision of public goods;
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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