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Regulation of Quality and the Ratchet Effect: Does Unverifiability Hurt the Regulator?

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  • Dalen, D.M.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Dalen, D.M., 1995. "Regulation of Quality and the Ratchet Effect: Does Unverifiability Hurt the Regulator?," Memorandum 35/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1995_035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Shogren, Jason F, 1995. "Competitive-Share Group Formation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 113-126, April.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 107-126.
    3. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1213-1244, September.
    4. Kamien, Morton I. & Zang, Israel, 1991. "Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 323-338, August.
    5. Nilssen, Tore, 1997. "On the Consistency of Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 89-100, March.
    6. Gaudet, G. & Salant, S., 1989. "Towards A Theory Of Horizontal Mergers," Papers 89-24, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    7. Matutes, Carmen & Padilla, A. Jorge, 1994. "Shared ATM networks and banking competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1113-1138, May.
    8. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    9. Wulfsberg, Fredrik, 1997. "An Application of Wage Bargaining Models to Norwegian Panel Data," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, pages 419-440.
    10. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 361-366.
    11. Town, R J, 1992. "Merger Waves and the Structure of Merger and Acquisition Time-Series," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(S), pages 83-100, Suppl. De.
    12. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 219-227.
    13. Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
    14. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 537-556.
    15. Nilssen, Tore & Sorgard, Lars, 1998. "Sequential horizontal mergers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 1683-1702.
    16. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    17. Beggs, Alan W, 1994. "Mergers and Malls," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 419-428, December.
    18. Colangelo, Giuseppe, 1995. "Vertical vs. Horizontal Integration: Pre-emptive Merging," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 323-337, September.
    19. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1993. "Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 205-229, October.
    20. Gabszewicz, J. & THORON, S., 1991. "Gains and losses from horizontal mergers," CORE Discussion Papers 1991008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    21. French, Kenneth R. & Poterba, James M., 1991. "Were Japanese stock prices too high?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 337-363.
    22. McAfee, R Preston & Williams, Michael A, 1992. "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 181-187, June.
    23. Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 465-499.
    24. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 473-486.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    REGULATION; SOCIAL WELFARE;

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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