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To Segment or Not to Segment Markets? A Note on the Profitability of Market Segmentation for an International Oligopoly

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Abstract

Recent research on endogenous market segmentation finds that a monopoly’s expected profit under perfectly segmented markets increases (relative to its profits under perfectly integrated markets) with exchange rate volatility. The firm thus has an incentive to make consumer resale increasingly difficult. We show that such an incentive may be absent for two firms competing in a Cournot fashion. While limitless consumer arbitrage forces a monopolist to deviate from its optimal pricing policies, it acts as a “disciplining device” helping the Cournot duopoly to approach and commit to the cartel solution in some markets. The firms’ total profit may hence be higher when they engage in integrated-market pricing and neither firm would have an incentive to take on additional costs to facilitate segmenting.

Suggested Citation

  • Gallo, Fredrik, 2010. "To Segment or Not to Segment Markets? A Note on the Profitability of Market Segmentation for an International Oligopoly," Working Papers 2010:5, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2010_005
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    File URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/Papers/WP10_5.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Gendron-Saulnier & Marc Santugini, 2013. "Noisy Learning and Price Discrimination: Implications for Information Dissemination and Profits," Cahiers de recherche 1335, CIRPEE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    arbitrage; Cournot duopoly; exchange rate volatility; market segmentation; third degree price discrimination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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