Strategic Saving and Non-Negative Gifts
O'Connell and Zeldes (1993) have shown that the dynamic inefficiency result of a standard gift model is reversed if parents can undersave strategically. I impose an explicit non-negativity constraint on gifts, which - for all numerical examples suggested by O'Connell and Zeldes - alters this result, by making gifts non-operative. However, for other realistic numerical examples, this is not the case.
|Date of creation:||31 Oct 1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden|
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