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Meaningful and Measurable Market Domination

Author

Listed:
  • la Cour, Lisbeth F.

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Møllgaard, H. Peter

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

The European Court of Justice’s definition of when a firm has a dominant position has recently come under attack as being meaningless and impossible to measure. We argue that both attacks are wrong, suggest an economic interpretation of domination and propose how it may be measured using modern time series econometrics. We illustrate the approach empirically.

Suggested Citation

  • la Cour, Lisbeth F. & Møllgaard, H. Peter, 2002. "Meaningful and Measurable Market Domination," Working Papers 09-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_009
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market domination; monopoly; competition policy; competition law;

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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