Circumventing Information and Incentive Problems in Pollution Control
To mitigate pollution this note advocates a two-component system. The polluter pays for the damage he causes and for the opportunity to do so. The main motivation is to achieve Pareto e¢ ciency while avoiding problems caused by asymmetric information and strategic moves. The proposed regime induces each polluter to solve the same optimization problem as an altruistic planner. Since the monetary burden of the scheme matches a linear Pigouvian tax, it does not encourage firms to split or merge.
|Date of creation:||10 Jun 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway|
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/en
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