Circumventing Information and Incentive Problems in Pollution Control
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Keywordsexternalities; asymmetric information; Pareto efficiency; environmental policy; linear Pigouvian tax; Individual Transferable Fees;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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