IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incitamentet til pensionsopsparing set i lyset af de nye regler for beskatning af pensionsafkast




I forbindelse med FL2001 er der vedtaget en række love, som får betydning for valget mellem aktier og obligationer i en pensionsordning og i et frit depot. Ændringerne betyder, at afkast af aktier og obligationer i en kapitalpension fra 2001 bliver genstand for den samme beskatning. Der er fortsat et incitament til at oprette, opretholde og indskyde på en kapitalpension. De gennemførte og foreslåede ændringer vil dog i løbet af perioden 2000-02 påvirke dette incitament afhængigt af, om kapitalpensionen er placeret i aktier eller i obligationer. En kapitalpension, der er placeret i aktier, bliver dårligere beskyttet mod hævning i løbet af perioden. Dette gælder navnlig, hvis kontohaveren har positiv kapitalindkomst og betaler topskat. Er kapitalpensionen i stedet placeret i obligationer, øges beskyttelsen, og den er for personer med positiv kapitalindkomst og topskat fortsat ganske betydelig. Såfremt ændringerne bevirker, at efterspørgslen efter aktier falder, vil det hovedsageligt gå ud over kurserne på de mindre selskabers aktier. Endelig er en konsekvens af de gennemførte ændringer, at statens provenu fra pensionsbeskatningen vil svinge langt mere fra år til år, end det har været tilfældet tidligere.

Suggested Citation

  • Guldager, Peter, 2000. "Incitamentet til pensionsopsparing set i lyset af de nye regler for beskatning af pensionsafkast," Working Papers 00-7, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2000_007 Note: Published in: Revision & Regnskabsvæsen, No. 2, 2001

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jan Svejnar & Evzen Kocenda, 2002. "The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm Performance after Large-Scale Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 471, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Saul Estrin, 2002. "Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 101-124, Winter.
    3. Nina Pavcnik, 2002. "Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements: Evidence from Chilean Plants," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 245-276.
    4. Simeon Djankov & Peter Murrell, 2002. "Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 739-792, September.
    5. Walsh, Patrick Paul & Whelan, Ciara, 2001. "Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 85-112, June.
    6. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-1223, December.
    7. Gérard Roland, 2004. "Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026268148x, January.
    8. Levinsohn, James, 1993. "Testing the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 1-22, August.
    9. James Levinsohn & Steven Berry & Ariel Pakes, 1999. "Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 400-430, June.
    10. S Estrin & P Hare, 1992. "Firms in Transition: Modelling Enterprise Adjustment," CEP Discussion Papers dp0089, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    11. Wei Li, 1999. "A Tale of Two Reforms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 120-136, Spring.
    12. Hall, Robert E, 1988. "The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 921-947, October.
    13. Harrison, Ann E., 1994. "Productivity, imperfect competition and trade reform : Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-2), pages 53-73, February.
    14. Lubomir Lizal & Miroslav Singer & Jan Svejnar, 2001. "Enterprise Breakups And Performance During The Transition From Plan To Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 92-99, February.
    15. Rafael La Porta & Florencio López-de-Silanes, 1999. "The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1193-1242.
    16. Olley, G Steven & Pakes, Ariel, 1996. "The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1263-1297, November.
    17. Lubomír Lízal & Jan Svejnar, 2002. "Investment, Credit Rationing, And The Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence From Czech Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 353-370, May.
    18. Jan Hanousek & Evzen Kocenda & Jan Svejnar, 2004. "Ownership, Control and Corporate Performance after Large-Scale Privatization," Microeconomics 0406002, EconWPA.
    19. Domowitz, Ian & Hubbard, R Glenn & Petersen, Bruce C, 1988. "Market Structure and Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Manufacturing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(1), pages 55-66, February.
    20. Krishna, Pravin & Mitra, Devashish, 1998. "Trade liberalization, market discipline and productivity growth: new evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 447-462, August.
    21. Roeger, Werner, 1995. "Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Difference between Primal and Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for U.S. Manufacturing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 316-330, April.
    22. Chang-Tai Hsieh, 2002. "What Explains the Industrial Revolution in East Asia? Evidence From the Factor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 502-526, June.
    23. Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 221-268 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Paul Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, 1995. "Privatization in Russia: What Should be a Firm?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(2), pages 297-327.
    25. Roman Frydman & Cheryl Gray & Marek Hessel & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1999. "When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1153-1191.
    26. Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1994. "Transition in Poland," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1169-1177, September.
    27. Konings, Jozef & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2002. "Does Antidumping Protection Raise Market Power? Evidence from Firm Level Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 3571, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    28. James R. Tybout, 2001. "Plant- and Firm-Level Evidence on "New" Trade Theories," NBER Working Papers 8418, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2000_007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helle Vinbaek Stenholt). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.