On Incentives for Sustainable Investments
There is a trend among institutional investors to split their assets between index-managers and specialists. The specialist mandates are typically delegated to specialist asset managers, who are assumed to generate "alpha", take on large risks and whose remuneration is performance based. In this paper, we will study how the optimal behavior of the specialist manager will depend on the remuneration structure.
|Date of creation:||19 Jan 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Economics of Corporate Sustainability Management, Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44 Stockholm, SWEDEN|
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