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Governing by supervision: The Case of Sweden

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    Various evaluations of the internal market suggest that member states’ implementation continues to lag behind in several areas. In addition to the European Court of Justice, the European Commission also has means for pursuing compliance without judicial recourse. Since 2002, the Commission coordinates the SOLVIT-network: national authorities with the mandate to resolve problems related to misapplications of internal market directives by informal means. Using the case of Sweden, we investigate the techniques used by SOLVIT and what impact these have on the administrative system of an individual member state. Drawing on a governmentality perspective, we find that SOLVIT Sweden contributes to juridification of the work methods through which the internal market is realized. The governmentality approach also highlights the policy-making capacity of ex post control. Specifically, the visibility provided by the national SOLVIT-centers work suggests a role as watchdogs for the Commission’s enforcement of the internal market.

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    Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration with number 2010:7.

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    Length: 18 pages
    Date of creation: 10 Nov 2010
    Date of revision: 12 Mar 2011
    Handle: RePEc:hhb:hastba:2010_007
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