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Decentralized but Dependent: Clientelism through Workfare

Author

Listed:
  • Attila Gáspár

    (ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies)

  • Győző Gyöngyösi

    (Utrecht University)

  • Balázs Reizer

    (ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies; Corvinus University of Budapest)

Abstract

This paper studies how discretionary intergovernmental transfers can sustain political dependence in decentralized systems. We develop a probabilistic voting model of two-layered clientelism in which the central government allocates workfare across municipalities while choosing whether programs are administered locally by mayors or centrally by state agencies. When mayors control access to jobs, the center can condition future allocations on local electoral performance, turning mayors into vote brokers. Using municipality-level administrative data on Hungary's workfare program and a difference-in-differences design, we show that higher workfare intensity increased support for both the national incumbent party and local mayors—but only when programs were administered by mayors rather than by state-owned enterprises following bureaucratic rules. Consistent with the model, municipalities that delivered weaker support in national elections subsequently received fewer positions in mayor-managed programs, and the electoral returns to workfare are larger where mayoral races are more competitive. Together, these findings show how discretionary local control and politically contingent funding can transform decentralization from a mechanism of accountability into one of vertical clientelism.

Suggested Citation

  • Attila Gáspár & Győző Gyöngyösi & Balázs Reizer, 2026. "Decentralized but Dependent: Clientelism through Workfare," KRTK-KTI WORKING PAPERS 2616, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:2616
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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