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Economic and Systemic Consequences of Adaptation to External and Internal Pressures Caused by Global Crisis in China


  • Maria Csanadi

    () (Institute of Economics Research Center for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences)


Global downturn in 2008 exerted strong adaptation pressures on China that incited prompt state response. The one-off large state intervention had consequences in several dimensions: on the one hand, it had a positive impact on the system's short-term economic, social and political stability by dynamizing different economic sub-spheres. State intervention, at the same time, temporary slowed down the process of economic transformation and also mobilized system characteristics that lead to overheating and to renewed state intervention to cool it down. This paper sheds light on the consequences of adaptation to external and internal pressures on national, sectoral, regional, and structural dimensions from a systemic point of view.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Csanadi, 2012. "Economic and Systemic Consequences of Adaptation to External and Internal Pressures Caused by Global Crisis in China," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1209, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1209

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-1480, November.
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    More about this item


    party-state model; short-term shocks; adaptation; system transformation; global crisis; overheating; spatial disparities;

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy
    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity

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