L’équilibre économique des aéroports secondaires européens à l’épreuve des dynamiques de concurrence fiscale

The rules governing State aid under European Union law is characterised by a dual objective: the prevention of distortions of competition between undertakings and the avoidance of phenomena of fiscal competition between territories. Such forms of fiscal competition arise from opportunities for location-based arbitrage, driven by differences in tax burdens and in the provision of public goods. While they may, in principle, form part of a process of yardstick competition whose effects can be beneficial, they may also be instrumentalised by undertakings, thereby leading both to instability in location choices and to a race to the bottom in taxation. These developments are particularly detrimental not only from an economic perspective but also with regard to European integration. The passenger air transport sector, marked by significant overcapacity at certain airports and by the expansion of low-cost carriers, provides a salient illustration of such dynamics. At a time when the 2014 Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines are under review, this contribution seeks to set out the underlying economic dynamics, the competitive issues at stake, and their implications for the internal market.