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A belief-based approach to signaling

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Koessler

    (GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marie Laclau

    (GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Tristan Tomala

    (GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We provide a geometric characterization of the set of interim equilibrium payoffs in the general class of costly signaling games. Our characterization offers a unified, belief-based framework to study both cheap talk and costly signaling, with or without transparent motives. The key ingredient is the analysis of Bayes-plausible belief distributions and signal-contingent interim values that are incentive-compatible for the sender. Geometrically, this leads to a constrained convexification of the graphs of the interim value correspondences. We apply and illustrate the results in a class of intimidation games. We also derive the sender's best equilibrium payoff under transparent motives. Finally, we compare the equilibrium outcomes to those arising when the sender can commit to a signaling strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2025. "A belief-based approach to signaling," Working Papers halshs-04455227, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-04455227
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04455227v3
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    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04455227v3/document
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