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Les marchés bifaces saisis par le droit de la concurrence Réflexions sur la décision Android de la Commission européenne

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Marty

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Julien Pillot

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

This work aims at analysing the EU Commission's decision Google Android of 18 July 2018. Rather than focusing on the deterring effect of the fine, we question both the underlying damage theory and the potential effects of associated remedies, especially with regard to Android's two-sided structure. Not only is this structure the keystone of Google's business model, but also that of Android's very technical architecture. Such a market structure induces specificities in terms of value creation and stakeholders' interdependence which urges to consider Google's practices (anti-fragmentation provisions and apps' pre-installation) under these two dimensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty & Julien Pillot, 2019. "Les marchés bifaces saisis par le droit de la concurrence Réflexions sur la décision Android de la Commission européenne," Working Papers halshs-01977022, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01977022
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    Keywords

    anticompetitive foreclosure; mobile operating systems; two-sided markets; exclusionary abuses; tying; marchés biface; abus d’éviction; ventes liées; verrouillage anticoncurrentiel;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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