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The European Energy Policy: From Competition to Solidarity?
[L ' Europe de l' énergie : de la concurrence à la solidarité ?]

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  • Frédéric Marty

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

The Art. 194 TFEU has offered new powers to European Union to coordinate Member States policies in the field of energy policy according to a logic of solidarity in order to achieve common goods, as the security of supply. This article, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, seems to offer to the Commission new levy to play in the energy policy field additionally to competition and environmental policies. However, this levy seems to be hindered by its subordination to Member States choices in terms of energy mix and external policy. The competition policy might appear as the only way to implement a European energy policy. However, the capacity of competition law enforcement to build energy market remains questionable. Our paper investigates to what extent a European policy based on solidarity and subsidiarity principles might address the difficulties of “energy only markets” to provide these common goods. To this end, we particularly investigate the case of long-term contracts and we rely on an economics of conventions theoretical framework.

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  • Frédéric Marty, 2016. "The European Energy Policy: From Competition to Solidarity?
    [L ' Europe de l' énergie : de la concurrence à la solidarité ?]
    ," Working Papers halshs-01273770, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01273770 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01273770
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    Keywords

    security of supply; energy; competition; long-term contracts; contrats de long terme; énergie; concurrence; sécurité d’approvisionnement;

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