The European Energy Policy: From Competition to Solidarity?
[L ' Europe de l' énergie : de la concurrence à la solidarité ?]
The Art. 194 TFEU has offered new powers to European Union to coordinate Member States policies in the field of energy policy according to a logic of solidarity in order to achieve common goods, as the security of supply. This article, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, seems to offer to the Commission new levy to play in the energy policy field additionally to competition and environmental policies. However, this levy seems to be hindered by its subordination to Member States choices in terms of energy mix and external policy. The competition policy might appear as the only way to implement a European energy policy. However, the capacity of competition law enforcement to build energy market remains questionable. Our paper investigates to what extent a European policy based on solidarity and subsidiarity principles might address the difficulties of “energy only markets” to provide these common goods. To this end, we particularly investigate the case of long-term contracts and we rely on an economics of conventions theoretical framework.
|Date of creation:||12 Feb 2016|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01273770|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01273770. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.