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Le dérapage des dettes publiques en questions : un essai d'inventaire

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  • Jean-Paul Pollin

    () (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

On the threshold of a possible crisis exit policymakers of advanced countries face a complicated dilemma. On the one hand, they must find a way to confront the surge of public debts ; on the other hand, they must avoid worsening the problem in trying to solve it. This presentation intends to consider the different questions relevant to this dilemma. To this end we first deal with expected evolutions of public debts and with the magnitude of budget adjustments required to contain these evolutions. Then we examine the desirable level and rate of these adjustments. Next we consider the imbalances that gave rise to the crisis, the resolution of which is a likely prerequisite for controlling indebtness. Lastly we highlight the institutional measures needed to facilitate credible political commitments in this domain.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Pollin, 2013. "Le dérapage des dettes publiques en questions : un essai d'inventaire," Working Papers halshs-00832368, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00832368 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00832368
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    Keywords

    Surge; Public debts; dérapage; dettes publiques;

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