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Endogenous Efforts On Networks : Does Centrality Matter ?

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  • Mohamed Belhaj

    () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales, ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille)

  • Frédéric Deroïan

    () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

Abstract

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with possible decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on the line network. We give conditions under which more central agents provide more efforts for general payofffunctions, and we fully characterize equilibria under geometric decay.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan, 2009. "Endogenous Efforts On Networks : Does Centrality Matter ?," Working Papers halshs-00353872, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00353872
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00353872
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    Keywords

    Communication Network; Endogenous Efforts; Strategic Complements;

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