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Opportunist politicians and the evolution ofelectoral competition

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-François Laslier

    (PREG-CRG - Pole de Recherche en Economie et Gestion - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bilge Ozturck

    (Department of Economics - GSU - Galatasaray University)

Abstract

We study a unidimensional model of spatial competition between two parties with two types of politicians. The office oriented politicians, referred to as "opportunist" politicians, care only about the spoils of the office. The policy oriented politicians, referred to as "militant" politicians have ideological preferences on the policy space. In this framework, we compare a winner-take-all system, where all the spoils go to the winner, to a proportional system, where the spoils of office are split among the two parties proportionally to their share of the vote.We study the existence of short term political equilibria and then, within an evolutionary setup, the dynamics and stability of policies and of party membership decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier & Bilge Ozturck, 2006. "Opportunist politicians and the evolution ofelectoral competition," Working Papers halshs-00121748, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00121748
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00121748v1
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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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