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Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Francois Cochard

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Alexandre Flage

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

Are people less socially oriented when sharing losses instead of gains? This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 33 studies with 114 estimates from ultimatum and dictator games in which participants share losses (of money, time, or even physical well-being) instead of gains. We provide evidence that dictators leave significantly more to receivers when sharing losses. Proposers are also fairer when sharing losses, but the result is only significant when protocol biases are controlled for. Receivers, on the other hand, demand significantly more in the loss-sharing ultimatum game than in the gain-sharing game. They also demand significantly more when the strategy method is employed. Moreover, we found that non-students are more generous and fairer when sharing losses than students. Finally, we found that, whether sharing a loss of time, a loss of money, or physical pain, players' behaviors do not differ in terms of the percentage of loss shared or demanded.

Suggested Citation

  • Francois Cochard & Alexandre Flage, 2024. "Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers hal-04390038, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04390038
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04390038
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    File URL: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04390038/document
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