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A built, even illegitimate public debt?
[Une dette publique construite, voire illégitime ?]

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Joumard

    (IFSTTAR/AME/LTE - Laboratoire Transports et Environnement - IFSTTAR - Institut Français des Sciences et Technologies des Transports, de l'Aménagement et des Réseaux - Université de Lyon)

Abstract

After criticizing the usual tools and units for presenting the public debt, we analyse the French public debt through using a great number of public long-term statistical data, up to 2013. The huge increase of public debt ratio since 1978 is mainly due to the State and marginally to the social welfare system. Analysing revenues and expenditures of public administrations shows that the debt is not the consequence of too high and inappropriate expenditures, but mainly the consequence of falling fiscal revenues – by five percentage points of GDP in 35 years. Then we model the impact of four of the mechanisms of the public deficit: tax breaks, tax evasion of individuals allowed by banking secrecy, effect of the economic crisis, snowball effect due to excessive interest rates. These mechanisms are respectively accountable for 840, 450, 310 and 400 billion euro of public debt in 2013, i.e. brought together 2 000 billion euro, when the debt amounts to only 1 940 billion: They explain therefore the whole public debt. Other mechanisms contributing at the same level to public deficit, but not modelled, reinforce these findings: The public debt is a built debt, consequence of political decisions, whose characteristics suggest in addition its illegitimacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Joumard, 2014. "A built, even illegitimate public debt? [Une dette publique construite, voire illégitime ?]," Working Papers hal-01250473, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01250473
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01250473
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    Keywords

    tax evasion; economic crisis; snowball effect; modelling; public debt; France; tax breaks; dette publique; cadeaux fiscaux; évasion fiscale; crise économique; effet boule de neige; modélisation;
    All these keywords.

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