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Comment organiser un marché de quotas ? Une évaluation du plan national français d'affectation des quotas d'emission de CO2


  • Olivier Godard

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


Having in view the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 in the framework of the Convention on Climate Change, European Authorities have taken the initiative to set up a European market of CO2 emission quotas for big emitters of industrial and energy sectors. According to an EU directive market, this market should be operational by January 2005. Meanwhile, each member state, not the Commission, had to choose the level of the total national ceiling for this instrument, the exact list of plants that will be concerned and the rules for allocating quotas to existing and new facilities. The French government announced its draft plan for allocation of CO2 quotas in June 2004 and the final one in July. The paper presents an assessment of this plan from the viewpoint of both overall quantities affected and impacts of rules of the game on incentives given to business. As a result, choices made by the French government rather express a concern not to damage national industry and energy producers, and even allocate rents to them, than phase-in appropriate economic incentives. This result fails to meet expectations that the plan put France on the right track to achieve emission reductions, on its own territory -it has been a permanent strategic statement of all French governments during the last ten years-, in line with its international commitments regarding the climate change issue (Kyoto Protocol) and long run emission reduction objectives claimed by the government of Prime minister Raffarin.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Godard, 2004. "Comment organiser un marché de quotas ? Une évaluation du plan national français d'affectation des quotas d'emission de CO2," Working Papers hal-00242938, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242938
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    References listed on IDEAS

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