Author
Listed:
- Laurent Bouton
(GU - Georgetown University [Washington], NBER - National Bureau of Economic Research [New York] - NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer
(QMUL - Queen Mary University of London, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)
- Antonin Macé
(PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)
- Dimitrios Xefteris
(University of Cyprus = Université de Chypre)
Abstract
When voters have different information quality, voting rules with richer ballot spaces can help voters better aggregate information by endogenously allocating more decision power to better-informed members. Using laboratory experiments, we compare two polar examples of voting rules in terms of ballot richness: majority voting (MV) and continuous voting (CV). Our results show that CV outperforms MV on average, although the difference is smaller than predicted, and that CV has more support than MV in treatments where it is expected to perform better. We also find that voters with intermediate information overestimate the importance of their votes under CV.
Suggested Citation
Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2025.
"Ballot Richness and Information Aggregation,"
PSE Working Papers
halshs-05214456, HAL.
Handle:
RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-05214456
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05214456v1
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