Minimum pricing or volumetric taxation? Quantity, quality and competition effects of price regulations in alcohol markets

Reforming alcohol price regulations in wine-producing countries is challenging, as current price regulations reflect the alignment of cultural preferences with economic interests rather than public health concerns. We evaluate and compare the impact of counterfactual alcohol pricing policies on consumer behaviors, firms, and markets in France. We develop a micro-founded partial equilibrium model that accounts for consumer preferences over purchase volumes across alcohol categories and over product quality within categories, and for firms' strategic price-setting. After calibration on household scanner data, we compare the impacts of replacing current taxes by ethanol-based volumetric taxes with a minimum unit price (MUP) policy of C0.50 per standard drink. The results show that the MUP in addition to the current tax outperforms a tax reform in reducing ethanol purchases (-15% vs. -10% for progressive taxation), especially among heavy drinking households (-17%). The MUP increases the profits of small and medium wine firms (+39%) while decreasing the profits of large manufacturers and retailers (-39%) and maintaining tax revenues stable. The results support the MUP as a targeted strategy to reduce harmful consumption while benefiting small and medium wine producers. This study provides ex-ante evidence that is crucial for alcohol pricing policies in wine-producing countries.