Author
Listed:
- Brigitte Dormont
(Legos - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)
- Pierre-Yves Geoffard
(PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
- Karine Lamiraud
(ESSEC Business School)
Abstract
Many countries have introduced competition in health insurance markets. Managed competition settings have been implemented in order to avoid risk selection problems. In Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Israel citizens can choose between different providers for basic coverage. In this article, we focus on the specific case of Switzerland which implemented managed competition in basic health insurance markets in 1996. We study to what extent consumer choice for one's basic health plan may interact with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance. The organization of social health insurance in France is currently very different from the Swiss system. However the question of regulating complementary health care insurance markets in France may be discussed in the middle/long run using the Swiss model. In Switzerland, competition in basic health insurance markets has not been effective so far. There is no evidence of premium convergence within cantons. Consumers have been reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behavior, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We show that low switching rates are the result of the existence of two health insurance markets which are regulated differently: the basic health insurance market where risk selection is prohibited and the supplementary health insurance market where risk selection practices are allowed. We show that holding a supplementary contract reduces the probability of switching basic insurance provider for those with poor self-assessed health but has no effect on the switching behavior of enrollees in good/very good health. The efficient management of competition in the basic insurance market may suffer from a lack of adequate regulation in the supplementary market.
Suggested Citation
Brigitte Dormont & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Karine Lamiraud, 2012.
"Assurance maladie en Suisse : l'assurance supplémentaire nuit-elle à la concurrence sur l'assurance de base ?,"
PSE Working Papers
hal-00795544, HAL.
Handle:
RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-00795544
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-00795544v1
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Dormont , Brigitte & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Lamiraud, Karine, 2013.
"Assurance maladie en Suisse : l'assurance supplémentaire nuit-elle à la concurrence sur l'assurance de base ?,"
ESSEC Working Papers
WP1303, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Brigitte Dormont & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Karine Lamiraud, 2012.
"Assurance maladie en Suisse : l'assurance supplémentaire nuit-elle à la concurrence sur l'assurance de base ?,"
Working Papers
hal-00795544, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
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JEL classification:
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
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