Author
Listed:
- Pierre Pestieau
(PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, ULiège - Université de Liège = University of Liège = Universiteit van Luik = Universität Lüttich, UCLouvain - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain)
- Maria Racionero
(ANU - Australian National University)
Abstract
We consider a society where social mobility is influenced by parental wealth transfers and education investments, with the latter capturing the time parents devote to the education of their children. These investments affect not only children's individual prospects but also the future distribution of productivity and wealth, an effect that parents do not internalize. We characterize optimal non‐linear taxation under two alternative informational assumptions, depending on whether educational investments are observable. When education is observable, marginal subsidies to education and wealth transfers can directly correct for their effects on the future distribution. When education is unobservable, income and wealth‐transfer taxation also serve as indirect instruments to influence parental education investments. In particular, a positive marginal income tax on high‐productivity individuals can be optimal, in contrast with the standard no‐distortion‐at‐the‐top result. We derive these results under a weighted utilitarian criterion and examine how they change under a Rawlsian social objective.
Suggested Citation
Pierre Pestieau & Maria Racionero, 2026.
"Optimal Tax Policies for Social Mobility With Wealth and Education Investments,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-05857780, HAL.
Handle:
RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-05857780
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70148
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