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About delay aversion

Author

Listed:
  • Lorenzo Bastianello

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Alain Chateauneuf

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IPAG Business School, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the behaviour of decision makers who show preferences for advancing the timing of future satisfaction. We give two definitions that are representative of this kind of attitude and investigate their implications in (an intertemporal version of) three popular models used in decision theory: the Expected Utility, the Choquet Expected Utility and the MaxMin Expected Utility models. The first definition reveals interesting links with the theory studying the impossibility of aggregating infinite streams of income, while keeping both strong monotonicity and equality among all generations. Our second definition turns out to be a behavioural characterization of what Irving Fisher called impatience. Finally, we make a connection with the notion of domination of one stream of income over another, for all interest rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Bastianello & Alain Chateauneuf, 2016. "About delay aversion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01302543, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01302543
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Faruk Gul & Paulo Natenzon & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2021. "Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2225-2259, September.
    2. Lorenzo Bastianello & José Heleno Faro, 2023. "Choquet expected discounted utility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1071-1098, May.
    3. Bastianello, Lorenzo, 2017. "A topological approach to delay aversion," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-12.
    4. Christopher P. Chambers & Federico Echenique, 2020. "The Pareto Comparisons of a Group of Exponential Discounters," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(2), pages 622-640, May.
    5. Jean-Pierre Drugeon & Thai Ha Huy, 2022. "A not so myopic axiomatization of discounting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(1), pages 349-376, February.
    6. Jean-Pierre Drugeon & Thai Ha-Huy, 2018. "Towards a Decomposition for the Future: Closeness, Remoteness & Temporal Biases," Working Papers halshs-01962035, HAL.
    7. Faruk Gul & Paulo Natenzon & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2020. "Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information," Working Papers 2020-71, Princeton University. Economics Department..

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