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From self-interest to collective action: The role of defaults in governing common resources

Author

Listed:
  • Eladio Montero-Porras
  • Rémi Suchon

    (UCL - Université catholique de Lille, ANTHROPO LAB - Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Expérimentale - ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille)

  • Tom Lenaerts
  • Elias Fernández Domingos

Abstract

Managing shared resources requires balancing personal profit and sustainability. This paper reports on a behavioural experiment testing how extraction defaults—either pro-social or exploitative—impact resource extraction in a common pool resource dilemma (CPRD). We find that an exploitative default increases average extraction compared to a control without a default, while a pro-social default temporarily reduces extraction. The effects of both defaults are temporary, and extraction levels converge to those in the control group, with the pro-social default fading faster. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under an exploitative default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. Our findings suggest that while defaults can promote short-term sustainability, their long-term effects are limited, and their effectiveness depends on individual traits.

Suggested Citation

  • Eladio Montero-Porras & Rémi Suchon & Tom Lenaerts & Elias Fernández Domingos, 2025. "From self-interest to collective action: The role of defaults in governing common resources," Post-Print halshs-05255172, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05255172
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0331348
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05255172v1
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