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Développement durable : gagnant-gagnant ou dilemme ? Les leçons du "paradoxe de Condorcet" pour gouverner une responsabilisation sociale


  • Jean-Pierre Chanteau

    () (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)


Un peu de mathématiques montre que le calcul ou le vote individuel ne peuvent seuls régler des problèmes collectifs même si chacun le désire vraiment. Il faut donc aussi des règles collectives sur les choix sociaux, et des procédures communes pour les adopter, afin de rendre possibles des compromis soutenables. Les réponses mixent une variété de dispositifs de "régulations conjointes" (contrats, conventions, traditions, coutumes…) et d’"autorités de régulation" (chef de famille, gouvernement…).

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Chanteau, 2017. "Développement durable : gagnant-gagnant ou dilemme ? Les leçons du "paradoxe de Condorcet" pour gouverner une responsabilisation sociale," Post-Print halshs-01581988, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01581988
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