La répression des pratiques délictueuses des dirigeants : le rôle des actionnaires
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- Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2004. "La répression des pratiques délictueuses des dirigeants le rôle des actionnaires," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 114(1), pages 99-110.
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Keywords
relation dirigeant/actionnaires; économie du droit; pénalisation;All these keywords.
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