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Construction de logements sociaux et stratégies électorales locales


  • Katharina Schone

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


Our article examines if local incumbents’ choices regarding social housing construction are influenced by strategic electoral considerations, which might foil the French state’s efforts in favour of greater social mixity. By constructing a probabilistic voting model which integrates a partially mobile population, we show that such strategic considerations let the political choices of neighbouring municipalities become interdependent, and that the intensity of the resulting strategic inter-actions varies in function of the local population’s mobility. These propositions are confirmed by our empirical analysis concerning social housing construction in the Greater Lyon region. A local incumbent’s willingness to construct social housing might thus effectively depend on his appraisal of this choice’s consequences on the long term evolution of his electoral base. Classification JEL : D72, R38, C21, H7
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  • Katharina Schone, 2013. "Construction de logements sociaux et stratégies électorales locales," Post-Print halshs-01228444, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01228444
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    More about this item


    Logements sociaux; Stratégies électorales locales;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations


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