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A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Béal

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Éric Rémila

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe Solal

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In Beal et al. (forthcoming) two new axioms of invariance, called Addition invariance and Transfer invariance respectively, are introduced to design allocation rules for TU-games. Here, we derive direct-sum decompositions of the linear space of TU-games by using the TU-games selected to construct the operations of Addition and Transfer. These decompositions allow us to recover previous characterization results obtained by Beal et al. (forthcoming), to provide new characterizations of well-known (class of) allocation rules and also to design new allocation rules

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance," Post-Print halshs-01096559, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01096559
    DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2014.12.019
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "Axioms of invariance for TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 891-902, November.
    2. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    3. van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
    4. Nowak, Andrzej S & Radzik, Tadeusz, 1994. "A Solidarity Value for n-Person Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 43-48.
    5. Ruiz, Luis M. & Valenciano, Federico & Zarzuelo, Jose M., 1998. "The Family of Least Square Values for Transferable Utility Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 109-130, July.
    6. Chun, Youngsub, 1989. "A new axiomatization of the shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 119-130, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2015. "Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 159-165.
    2. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2014. "Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value," Working Papers hal-01377929, HAL.
    3. Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2016. "Characterizations of weighted and equal division values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(4), pages 649-667, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game Theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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