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L’Autorité de la concurrence doit-elle, dans le cadre de sa fonction consultative, disposer de toutes les libertés ? Retour sur l’avis concernant la distribution alimentaire à Paris


  • Marc Deschamps

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur)


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  • Marc Deschamps, 2012. "L’Autorité de la concurrence doit-elle, dans le cadre de sa fonction consultative, disposer de toutes les libertés ? Retour sur l’avis concernant la distribution alimentaire à Paris," Post-Print halshs-00859157, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00859157
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Christopher F Baum & Mark E. Schaffer & Steven Stillman, 2003. "Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 3(1), pages 1-31, March.
    2. Francesco Lissoni & Jacques Mairesse & Fabio Montobbio & Michele Pezzoni, 2011. "Scientific productivity and academic promotion: a study on French and Italian physicists," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 253-294, February.
    3. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
    4. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, January.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    6. James Adams & Zvi Griliches, 1996. "Measuring Science: An Exploration," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1749, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    7. Carayol, Nicolas & Matt, Mireille, 2004. "Does research organization influence academic production?: Laboratory level evidence from a large European university," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1081-1102, October.
    8. Carayol, Nicolas & Matt, Mireille, 2006. "Individual and collective determinants of academic scientists' productivity," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, March.
    9. Suraj Prasad, 2009. "Task assignments and incentives: generalists versus specialists," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 380-403.
    10. Thiele, Veikko, 2010. "Task-specific abilities in multi-task principal-agent relationships," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 690-698, August.
    11. Clément Bosquet & Pierre-Philippe Combes, 2012. "Un panorama de la recherche française en économie comparant les approches Google Scholar et Econlit," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(4), pages 477-545.
    12. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 95-109.
    13. Louis Lévy-Garboua, 2008. "Rapport sur le premier concours national d'agrégation de l'enseignement supérieur pour le recrutement de Professeurs des Universités en Sciences Economiques (Année 2007-2008)," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(5), pages 603-623.
    14. Glenn MacDonald & Leslie M. Marx, 2001. "Adverse Specialization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 864-899, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Florent Venayre, 2015. "L'efficacité du pouvoir ultramarin d'injonction structurelle en question," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-50, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.

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    Autorité de la concurrence; avis;


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