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Social Security and Demographic Shocks


  • Gabrielle Demange

    (DELTA - Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Laroque Guy

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - ENSAE ParisTech - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique)


An overlapping generations model of social security with shocks to the productivity of labor and capital and demographic shocks is studied. We focus attention on stationary long run allocations. An allocation is interim optimal if there does not exist another feasible allocation that improves the expected welfare of all generations, computed conditionally on the state of the world when they are born. We characterize the set of interim optimal allocations and study the equilibria associated with various institutional forms of social security from the point of view of this optimality criterion. We obtain the analogs of the two traditional welfare theorems of microeconomic theory. Assume that there exists a financial asset in fixed quantity, which supports some (non null) intergenerational transfers. Then the rational expectations equilibrium allocation of this economy is interim optimal. Conversely, any stationary interim optimal allocation can be supported by such an equilibrium, with adequate lump sum transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabrielle Demange & Laroque Guy, 1999. "Social Security and Demographic Shocks," Post-Print halshs-00670903, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670903
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 419-427.
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    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General


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