La notion de normalisation comptable (entre normalisation industrielle et normalisation sociale)
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More about this item
Keywordsaccounting; accounting standardization; accounting standard; funds-flow statement; comptabilité; normalisation comptable; norme; norme comptable; tableau de financement;
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