La coordination des acteurs lors d'une attaque spéculative : l'apport des jeux globaux
This article surveys the literature on the question of the coordination of actors during international currency and financial crises. Until recently, this question had not found any satisfying theoretical answer. We briefly present the global games' theory before presenting its applications to speculative attacks and its implications in terms of economic policy. We finally evoke the challenges this new literature has to face.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in Working Paper du GATE 2002-11. 2002|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00178468|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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